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This report analyses efforts to control corruption in twelve countries of the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU), namely Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Russia.  It argues 
that despite a general trend towards the augmentation of anti-corruption 
interventions, national contexts each show different degrees of integration between 
global anti-corruption and local enforcements. The evidence indicates tensions 
between internationally-led policies and local practices.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the past decade corruption has become the major challenge that FSU countries have 
had to face in their journey towards modernisation. Despite numerous anti-corruption 
interventions, a growing industry of consultants, programmes and funding packages, the 
region continues to display rather ambiguous trends. According to Transparency 
International’s 2012 report, nearly all the countries in this region fall below the global 
average (Georgia is the exception). The similar World Bank Control of Corruption shows 
countries in the region below the level of sub-Saharan Africa, the least developed part of the 
world (see Figure 1). Within the region, only four countries are above the regional average, 
with Georgia the anti-corruption champion, followed by Armenia, Moldova and Belarus (see 
Figure 2). Even though these instruments are the best we have, they have certain 
limitations. TI’s corruption perception index (TI CPI) is based on expert perceptions and 
does not allow for cross-country comparison over time (Knack 2006; Galtung 2005). The 
WB indicator is also criticised for being insensitive to change (Mungiu Pippidi 2013). 
Despite the limitations clearly stated in the methodological annexes, media and policy 
makers consistently use them as reliable indicators of performance. Such indexes have 
moulded policy interventions, influenced donors and shaped public opinion. International 
anti-corruption reforms therefore lack specificity and follow a generic pattern based on a 
set of tools provided by the international community (Persson, Rothstein, Teorell 2010). 
The instruments are powerful advocacy tools, but anti-corruption reforms might be more 
effective if based on more contextualized instruments. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Regional trends of corruption control 
 
 
Source: World Bank Control of Corruption, Hertie School of Governance regional aggregation.  
Legend: rank from 1 to 100, with 100 least corrupt. 
 
With this view, the paper offers a qualitative analysis of anti-corruption interventions in the 
region. It is based on secondary data such as: monitoring reports provided by major 
international institutions, implementation documents, regional research papers, newspaper 
articles and various ranking/measurement indexes (provided by World Bank, Transparency 
International, Freedom House etc).  In order to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
material, the sources were cross-checked and data used if it was mentioned by more than 
two reliable sources. Despite using various media sources, this paper is not based on a 
systematic media review. For the purposes of this endeavour, corruption is defined as ‘the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain’ (TI); an anti-corruption intervention is anything 
labelled as such by donors, receivers, governments, the private sector, civil society or the 
general public. In order to trace anti-corruption initiatives, the paper is organised into three 
main sections. The first section discusses the opportunities and resources for corruption. 
The second section looks at its deterrents and the third section focuses on anti-corruption 
and its prospects.  
 
 
Figure 2. Performance on control of corruption- former Soviet Union 
 
 
Source: World Bank Control of Corruption 2012 
Legend: rank from 1 to 100, with 100 least corrupt. 
 
Opportunities and resources for corruption 
 
 
The model of resources and constraints developed by Mungiu-Pippidi (this volume) 
would indeed predict poor control of corruption in this region, although we register 
impressive developments at the level of legal constraints (anticorruption strategies). For 
instance, red tape and corruption of officials continue to be major challenges for business. 
The 2013 World Bank ‘Ease of doing business’ ranking shows incoherent development. By 
that measure, the higher the position the worst the economic environment; and of 185 
economies ranked, Uzbekistan was at 154, Tajikistan 141, Ukraine 137, Russia 112, 
Moldova 83, Kyrgyzstan 70, Azerbaijan 67, Belarus 58, Kazakhstan 49, Armenia 32 and 
Georgia 9. For the countries at the bottom, the main problems are related to corruption, 
weak enforcement of contract law, poor institutional frameworks and poor corporate 
governance.  The Wall Street Journal reported that nearly 33% of top officials and finance 
professionals suggested that corruption was a major hindrance to the Russian economy. 
The Moscow Times reports that 95% of surveyed businessmen feel that due to corruption, 
the current environment is not encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship.  
 
Such bleak perceptions might also be because the business climate is dominated by the 
intrusion of government into business, which is a major resource for corruption 
(Klitgaard 1988). Large state-run enterprises with heavy impact on national economies are 
a common factor. In Kazakhstan, Samruk-Kazyna controls more than half the national 
economy and manages the state assets in oil and gas, energy, transport, telecommunication, 
and the financial and innovation sectors. Moreover, it “has a pre-emptive right to buy 
strategic facilities and bankrupt assets. It is exempt from government procurement 
procedures … has the right to establish its own procurement rules”1. In the face of such 
extraordinary powers, the private sector and foreign companies face serious obstacles. In 
Tajikistan, little effort has been made to increase the transparency of state owned 
enterprises, the ruling elite benefiting directly from enterprises such as the Tajik 
Aluminium Company (TALCO)2. According to Freedom House (2012), TALCO uses 40% of 
the country's electricity supply, and its production is sold through 'opaque' entities 
registered in the British Virgin Islands. A common practice is selling state property to close 
allies of the regime for an artificially low price. Sometimes the buyer is a company set up 
just days before the sale. In Georgia, "Geoland" LLC bought 8000 sq. m. of land in the 
Kazbegi Municipality, later sold for a nominal sum in November, 2012. It has been revealed 
that the brother of the mayor of Tbilisi, Irakli Ugulava, owns 50% of the shares of the 
company3.  
 
The great mineral resources of the region are a similarly important resource for 
corruption, as they provide a powerful incentive to the international community to overlook 
national problems with democracy and corruption, as well as offering a consistent source of 
rents for local elites. In Kazakhstan, US foreign investment totalled $177.7 billion in 
September 2012 and the bulk of that was directed to the gas and oil sectors. In those 
sectors, corruption scandals involved internal actors, politicized actions and prestigious 
international economic entities. For instance, in November 2012 a senior Kyrgyz Energy 
Ministry official was accused of providing an operating licence to the company KasEnergo 
which had bought energy at a discount price and then sold it to the general public at a far 
higher price. The fraudulent scheme had an estimated value of 1.7 million Kyrgyzstan som 
(KGS) or $36,0004. Meanwhile, the government-owned Kazakh company KazMunaiGaz has 
decided to put red dye into diesel produced at the Pavlodar refinery. Bloomberg reports 
that the Pavlodar refinery will “colour 159,500 metric tons of the fuel ... destined to be 
sold”5. A high profile scandal form Kazakhstan (Atyrau region) involved an estimated $100 
million-worth of damage to the state budget, and the brother of the recently dismissed 
regional governor Bergey Ryskaliyev is under investigation for fraud. Sceptical observers 
suggest that this corruption scandal is “all part of a wider battle of Kazakhstan’s … bickering 
clans” and not a ‘genuine’ corruption scandal6.  
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Major international companies have also been linked with alleged corruption 
involving the Kazakh Customs Service. An international consortium, known as 
Tengrizchevroil, consisting of Chevron Corp., ExxonMobil Corp. and Deutsche Post AG’s 
logistics business DHL opened an investigation into allegations that DHL bribed customs 
officials in Kazakhstan on behalf of the group. Allegedly, DHL paid “convoy bribes” on behalf 
of Tengizchevroil, in order to ensure that “escorts” did not delay the shipping of 
Tengizchevroil’s equipment; the partnership’s logistics agents regularly paid $150 to $300 
in bribes to customs officials, which DHL then reimbursed7. Customs services in the region 
are reputedly corrupt: as recently as 2007 Global Integrity reported that $140 million in 
bribes were collected by Kazakh Customs.  
 
Two more factors foster corruption in the region: ethnic conflicts and underground 
black economies. The realities of those factors on the ground have determined the policy 
makers to combine anti-corruption policies and aid packages with policies against drug-
related crime, tax evasion and avoidance, security crime and terrorism. The conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh prompted military aid from the 
United States. Armenia received $600,000 and Azerbaijan $2,700,000, while Nagorno 
Karabakh as a de facto independent state received $5,000,000 . The Georgian military 
service received $1,800,000 and $12,000,000 in 2013, probably in relation to the Georgia - 
Russia conflict of 2008 over South Osetia. The regional bilateral tension between 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan has been causing significant social and economic harm, as 
Kyrgyz nationalists suppressed the Uzbek population in Osh, and Uzbeks have begun to 
withdraw their business and assets from the region8. The Anti-Crime and Corruption 
Department Chief of the Kyrgyz Ministry was killed in Osh, his death allegedly caused for 
professional motives9.  
 
The NATO operation in Afghanistan prompted substantial amounts of foreign aid in 
the region, another resource of corruption reported in the literature (Ledeneva 2003). 
For example, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan received $355 million and $214 million according 
to OECD statistics. Because of a lack of proper oversight, in 2007 an investigation by the 
National Bank of Tajikistan revealed that the government had misused $310 million of aid10.  
There have been no major aid-related scandals since then, and in 2010 with help from the 
UNDP, Tajikistan has created the Donor Anti-Corruption Forum which has sought to 
increase transparency in the distribution of foreign aid. Meanwhile, the conflict has 
strengthened the cross-border drug trade for all the countries that were part of the NATO’s 
Northern Distribution Network. That situation led to an increase in the bribes demanded by 
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border officials and other members of the transit sector.  UNODC highlighted that 
approximately 90 MT of heroin was trafficked along the ‘northern route’ in 2010. 
 
 Deterrents and constraints 
 
Implementing anti-corruption reforms required both an expansion and a 
specialisation of its institutional establishment. Specialised anti-corruption bodies have 
been set up in most of the FSU countries, usually under the direct supervision of the highest 
level of political authority (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Russia, Ukraine). 
On the one hand that endows them with high prestige and shows the governments’ ‘political 
will’. For example, the Armenian Ethics Commission for High Ranking Officials was praised 
by the OECD. On the other hand it makes them susceptible to political influence. The Agency 
of the Republic of Kazakhstan on Fighting Economic and Corruption Crimes was accused of 
acting at the political whim of President Nazarbayev11; the Tajik Agency for State Financial 
Control and Fight against Corruption was created in 2008, but it is still understaffed and 
perceived as one of the country's most corrupt institutions12. In Ukraine, the National 
Anticorruption Committee has not held a meeting for over a year and the 800 million hryvna 
budget for implementing the anticorruption programme has never been allocated13. Such 
mixed results call into question the necessity for designated anti-corruption institutions at 
the national level.  
 
A strong and effective law enforcement system is very much a necessary condition 
for modernisation (Della Porta and Vanucci 1999). Within the FSU countries, anti-
corruption reforms related to law enforcement had two purposes: first to create a strong 
and reliable judicial system that could tackle corruption outside it, and second to eliminate 
corruption within the law enforcement agencies themselves.  
 
Within the general anti-corruption framework, policies related to law enforcement 
agencies generally aim to increase the level of criminalization through higher crime rates, 
higher sentences and high profile offenders. The volume of corruption –related crimes has 
increased. In Kazakhstan financial investigators identified nearly 1,800 corruption cases in 
public procurement between 2008 and 2012, with financial damage amounting to more 
than $46 million14. In 2012, the Russian authorities prosecuted 889 officials (including 244 
city mayors and 114 lawmakers of various levels) and 1,159 law enforcement officials on 
corruption charges15. In Belarus, 276 corruption cases were prosecuted while the Ukrainian 
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courts received 2,740 criminal cases involving corruption. In 2012, the damage from 
corrupt cases in Ukraine was nearly $225 million, according the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Justice. It is a challenge to interpret these statistics. On the one hand, they can be seen to 
show the efficiency of the justice system. On the other hand, they reveal that judicial 
resources have been directed towards anti-corruption, in accordance with the government 
priorities. That leads to the specialization of a significant body of police forces and 
magistrates in the anti-corruption area and puts additional pressure on the rest. On 
average, corruption amounts to roughly 1.5% of the total number of crimes. For example, in 
Belarus, where there was a general decline in crime in 2012, the share of corruption cases 
decreased slightly from 1.3% to 1.1%16.  
 
 Higher crime rates are associated with harsher sentences. The former Kyrgyz 
president Bakiyev and his son were sentenced to twenty five years in prison for abuse of 
office. According to Miroslav Niyazov, former Secretary of the Security Council of 
Kyrgyzstan, those events were just for show, initiated by the authorities in the hope that 
they would be rehabilitated in the eyes of the public17. In January 2013, David Kezerashvili, 
the former Georgian Defence Minister, was indicted for taking bribes and smuggling. He 
allegedly obtained $12 million from smuggling ethanol, which caused a loss to the State of 
$50 million. The ex-minister faces  punishment of 11 to 15 years imprisonment18.  
 
The high profile of the offender is usually coupled with significant financial 
prejudices. In 2012, the region offered numerous examples of waves of high profile 
investigations, indictments and arrests. In Kazakhstan, Bergey Ryskaliev, the former mayor 
of Atyrau region, was accused of embezzling funds by awarding contracts for public 
procurement to his friends and relatives, signing contract agreements at wilfully inflated 
sums, and of making unjustified transfers of funds to contractors by fictitious acts of 
completion and subsequent withdrawals of the same funds through false accounts. The 
financial damage amounted to over $469,665,00019. In Kyrgyzstan the following individuals 
were arrested: an MP from "Ata-Jurt" Nariman Tyuleev, a former mayor of the capital, the 
Minister of Social Development, Ravshan Sabirov the deputy of “Ata-Meken” followed by the 
Head of Criminal Investigation Department Tilek Alibaev along with his second-in-
command Bazarbekov Abdraimova; and the leaders of the mobile telephone company 
"Megakom”20. A former Armenian Environment Minister, Vardan Ayvazyan, demanded a 
bribe from a gold mining company and was subsequently fined $37.5 million by a US court 
although no investigation was launched in Armenia21. Furthermore, the former head of the 
State Social Security Service was arrested and accused of embezzling approximately 
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$278,00022. In Uzbekistan arrests were made of more than 40 members of a group headed 
by Akbarali Abdullayev, a nephew of the President. Until recently Abdullayev was 
considered a likely candidate for the post of President of the Senate and regarded as a 
potential "successor" to Karimov. The shadow "owners" of the Fergana Valley were arrested 
too. They were from the Akramovyh clan and closely related to Akbarali and his mother 
Tamara Sabirova, who herself owned 70% of the industries in the Fergana valley. Allegedly, 
the arrests were made on the direct orders of President Karimov23. In Russia, a former 
Minister of Agriculture, Elena Skrynnik, was accused of involvement in a $1.3 billion fraud. 
The former deputy head of the Russian Ministry for Regional Development, Roman Panov 
was accused of embezzling funds allocated for the APEC summit in Vladivostok, and 6.5 
billion roubles were reported to have gone missing from the budget intended for the 
GLONASS development system24. 
 
Such high profile arrests could have been seen as signs of commitment by the 
relevant nations’ leaders to stepping up their anti-corruption efforts. More often, though, 
they were interpreted as acts of punishment of adversaries. The politicised nature of anti-
corruption reforms effectively undermined its core aim by confusing the spheres of victim 
and offender. In Ukraine there are allegations that the Yanukovych administration would 
use the judiciary to persecute its political opponent, Yulia Tymoshenko. In Russia, in 
November 2012, President Putin dismissed the Defence Minister Anatoly E. Serdyukov after 
the police raided the property of a land agency involved in the sale on the open market of a 
valuable state-owned property near Moscow. It was known as the Oboronservis case and 
the losses to the Defence Ministry from corruption were allegedly $130 million25. The 
removal of Serdyukov was one of the highest-level dismissals linked to a corruption case in 
recent times in Russia. Many had viewed Serdyukov as part of Putin’s inner circle, and while 
the gesture might be seen as Putin’s pledge in his third presidency to address corruption, it 
might just as well be the case that the Minister’s active reforms of the armed forces by 
cutting costs and personnel were received with displeasure.  
 
 In order to reduce corruption within law enforcement agencies, a popular reform 
envisaged the use of technology. In Kyrgyzstan, a new recruitment system for judges put in 
place in 2012 consisted of computerised examinations. In Kazakhstan, President 
Nazarbayev initiated the “Law Enforcement Attestation Process”, an exercise that involved 
competency testing for officers from a wide range of law enforcement agencies. According 
to the USDOS website, “This exercise diverted the attention of many officers from their 
regular duties and led to the dismissal or transfer of thousands of officers.”  
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New repressive policies have been associated with the desire to ‘cleanse’ the law 
enforcement agencies. Georgian President Saakashvili famously sacked the entire traffic 
police force to solve corruption problems; the strategy proved successful in Georgia but it is 
debatable whether it could be successfully transplanted to other countries.  Furthermore, 
mass lay-offs might be a successful anti-corruption policy, but they bear enormous social 
costs. Putin, for example, remarked that ‘Georgia has a few thousand traffic cops; Russia has 
over a million. Firing them all at once is simply not an option26.’ Instead, he issued 
statements telling the secret police (FSB) to stop intimidating businesses and to stop trying 
to extort bribes. Complementary policies involve incentivizing by increasing the salaries of 
the public sector and offering financial rewards to whistle-blowers. In November 2012 the 
Kyrgyz government announced a new scheme to reduce corruption among the judiciary by 
raising the salaries of judges. In August 2012, Kazakhstan allocated $213,000 a year to 
incentives for citizens to report cases of police corruption. Rewards may range from $300 to 
$1000 depending on the type of wrongdoing uncovered. The rewards are to be paid only in 
cases where officials are found guilty of corruption in court.  It remains to be seen whether 
the policy will be successful.  
 
Civil society, as a normative deterrent to corruption, is reportedly the weakest link in 
the former Soviet Union (Mungiu-Pippidi 2010), and is strongly associated with loose 
control of corruption (see Figure 3). Government pressures, restrictive regulatory 
frameworks, irregular funding and lack of support from state institutions are the main 
challenges faced by civil society in FSU countries.  
 
Figure 3. Civil society and control of corruption  
 
 
Legend: Association (linear regression) between control of corruption and civil society, 
Ukraine is the only outlier 
Source: Mungiu-Pippidi 2010, updated with 2012 data 
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The low capability of civil society in constraining state capture is to be expected seeing 
the state of democracy in the region. Some countries, such as Belarus, are still categorized as 
‘repressive states’ according to the 2013 Freedom House index of civil and political freedom 
rights. Formal government constraints on civil society organisations are common in 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, where the right of association and assembly is severely 
restricted. In Tajikistan, organizing an 'illegal gathering' can result in up to five years in 
prison, while in Kazakhstan participation in an 'illegal gathering' can lead to a $550 fine27. In 
both countries there are criminal penalties for insulting the President, and political 
dissident groups have been targeted.  In 2012, Russia expanded the definition of ‘treason’, 
reintroduced defamation as a criminal offence and increased the fines associated with it to 
2million roubles, or $61,000. Fines for individuals or organisations who violate the laws on 
arranging and participating in protests increased 150 and 300-fold respectively in June 
201228. New legislation now forces organisations that accept foreign funding or donations 
to register as ‘foreign agents,’ while also tightening membership criteria and increasing 
‘supervision.’ Critics claim that such legislation is designed to stop any capacity for 
government opposition and the term ‘foreign agents’ carries some seriously negative Soviet 
connotations. NGOs in Russia have reported numerous cases of government intimidation 
such as police raids, the stationing of ‘protective’ units of police in offices and the expulsion 
of certain organisations, like USAID. 
 
Due to the rising profile of civil society, some governments have started to create 
alliances with various NGOs. Such alliances can become iconic partnerships, but can also be 
the means by which politicians use an alternative voice to put forward their opinions – 
which is rather more commonly the case in the region under discussion here. Political 
interference can lead to preferential treatment, funding and corruption. In Uzbekistan, more 
than one NGO was involved in anti-corruption awareness campaigns; the 2012 Istanbul 
Action Plan report noticed that it was unclear "based on which criteria NGOs are selected to 
assist the Government in its anti-corruption efforts", while in Armenia, certain NGOs 
benefited from  Government largesse. In April 2013, the Armenian Ministry of Finance 
declared that between 2010 and 2013 31 NGOs were funded from the state budget, together 
receiving approximately $ 1,215,000 . Local media reported that no information could be 
found on the internet about the first three recipients of the funding. Furthermore, each of 
the six NGOs that had been sponsored without interruption over the three years had been 
set up by the same person, a certain Suren Nersisyan29. 
 
Nevertheless, successful cooperation between governments and civil society in the area of 
anti-corruption reforms is possible. In Armenia, the Association of Investigative Journalists 
(HETQ) was extensively involved in the ‘Armenia against Corruption’ project.  The Central 
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Election Commission of Ukraine requested and implemented a voter-awareness campaign 
with the OSCE during the parliamentary election there in 2012.  
 
Online activism in the area of anti-corruption has become very notorious in Russia. In 2011 
Alexey Navalny established the Anti-Corruption Fund Rospil as a way to increase 
transparency in public procurement. Rospil uncovered violations in the awarding of public 
contracts that amounted to 30 billion roubles in 2012. In November 2012 he launched a 
new project – RosZKH – which aimed to eradicate corrupt practices in housing and 
communal services. Similarly, in Ukraine, the site nashigroshi.org (“Our Money”) 
investigates corruption in the field of public contracts. Nashi Groshi has recently uncovered 
one $22,270 tender for snow removal from the courtyards of presidential administration 
buildings; another investigation showed that the annual travel expenses for members of the 
Supreme Administrative Court amounted to $270,68530. In Ukraine, online activists created 
an online civil map of corruption – CorruptUA, where citizens can report corruption and 
place it on a map of the country. 
 
The risks faced by civil society activists are very serious. After a recent criminal case 
Aleksey Navalny faces 10 years in prison for allegedly embezzling $500,000 from a state-
controlled timber company in Kirov in 2009. Prosecutors initially dismissed the case, but 
federal officials revived it after Navalny became the most prominent leader of the street 
protests last year. In Belarus, the protests that followed the 2010 elections were brutally 
suppressed with hundreds of arrests. The government continued its policy of harassing civil 
activists and treated them as enemies of the state; draft amendments were signed by 
President Lukashenka to restrict funding options for civil society organisations31. In 
preparation for the upcoming elections in Azerbaijan, officials tend to prevent activists from 
taking part in any actions or protests32. 
 
The other factor inflicting normative constrains, a free media, is likewise doing 
rather badly in FSU. The 2013 World Press Freedom Index provided by Reporters Without 
Borders shows that media freedom is not high on the agenda of the FSU states. Captured 
media, violence against journalists and repressive governments are just a few of the 
characteristics of these countries. In Belarus, suppression of the media continued after the  
disputed elections in 2010; in 2011 95 journalists were detained during the summer’s 
“silent protests”33. The Kazakhstan International Bureau of Human Rights reported that 
there were particular concerns regarding freedom of expression due to increases in libel 
suits against newspapers and journalists, along with physical attacks. In 2012, the two main 
opposition newspapers, Golos Respubliki and Vzglyad, were forced to halt publication a 
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matter of days after the prosecutor-general's office announced that it had asked an Almaty 
court to ban a number of independent and opposition national news outlets, before any 
ruling had been made on the substance of the case34. In Ukraine, the 2012 Freedom House 
report noted an increasing monopolisation of national media by pro-government 
businessmen and politicians as well as an increase in paid political coverage. The same 
report remarked that in Uzbekistan, foreign broadcasting media outlets - Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of America, BBC World Service - cannot obtain permission to 
broadcast from within that country nor can they acquire accreditation for their offices. 
Furthermore, the authorities employ the practice of hiring “experts” to fashion criminal 
cases against journalists on charges ranging from national defamation to extremism.  
 
 
Anticorruption and its prospects 
 
The past decade was characterized by the globalisation of anti-corruption policies, 
conducted first and foremost through the multiplication of anti-corruption narratives, 
materialised in the form of international conventions. The conventions provided the 
international community with a standardised set of anti-corruption instruments. FSU 
countries have all become part of the global anti-corruption movement, at least formally. 
They have all ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and 
Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan adopted the Council of 
Europe Civil and Criminal Law Conventions on Corruption, with Russia paving the way by 
signing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in April 2012.  
 
The expansion of the anti-corruption domain was accompanied by the multiplication of 
international/regional partnerships that monitored and incentivised the implementation of 
anti-corruption reforms – the ‘carrot and stick’ approach, in fact.  
• The OECD’s Anti-Corruption Network for Eastern and Central Asia established the 
Istanbul Action Plan in 2003, a sub-regional peer review programme, for Ukraine, 
Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.  
• The European Union has monitored anti-corruption reforms through the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. The latest report uncovered the 
lack of a coherent trend towards modernisation in the region. It expressed concerns 
regarding Azerbaijan in relation to the following areas: the electoral process, 
independence of the judiciary, protection of human rights, alignment of media 
freedom legislation to international standards, and the need to build a sustainable 
democracy. Praise went to Georgia, Moldova and to a certain extent Armenia, who 
were assured of continued financial support from Brussels.  
• In the latest meeting of EURONEST (Baku, April 2012), Ukraine advanced its 
negotiations on the Association Agreement with the EU, making progress on the 
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Visa Liberalisation Action Plans. The Agreement should be signed in November at 
the Vilnius Partnership Summit, if Ukraine steps up its anti-corruption efforts.  
• Furthermore, within the Partnership for Modernisation, the EU has agreed to 
finance a joint anti-corruption project to be implemented by the Council of Europe 
and the Russian Business Ombudsman. The European Commission has made a 
priority of supporting projects aimed at promoting good governance in both 
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan.   
• The World Bank chose Tajikistan as one of four European and Central Asian states 
in which to pilot its Governance and Anti-Corruption programme.  The programme 
has worked to strengthen transparency and accountability in the public sector.  
• National governments too have made available financial support in the region. The 
UK has a £42 million budget administered through the Department for International 
Development Central Asia programme.  
 
 
Apart from generic support for anti-corruption reforms, the international community also 
promoted more in-depth interventions intended to ‘change the rules’. The European 
External Action Service (EEAS) allocated € 1,470,000.00 to encourage political participation 
among the young residents of rural areas of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. EEAS also 
allocated €97,602.95 to Georgia, particularly to the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Within the 
framework of human rights, that particular project focuses on the re-socialization of young 
offenders. 
 
Monitoring aspects that were considered particularly challenging in the area were high on 
the agenda of the international donors. USAID has allocated large amounts to the 
presidential and parliamentary elections in Armenia and Georgia $3.988.000 and $17 
million respectively. However, it did not allocate any financial resources for the upcoming 
presidential elections in Azerbaijan, which will be held on the 16th of October 2013. The 
purpose of the funds was to ensure the transparency of the elections, to minimize 
corruption risks, and to assist electoral institutions and stakeholders in strengthening the 
political will to change the election culture. The idea is to enable the establishment of a 
competitive electoral environment as well as to support the broadcasting of TV 
programmes to increase citizens’ awareness of their rights and duties as voters. 
 
Since countries in this region are keen to attract foreign investment, the impact of 
corruption on the private sector is dealt with separately. The success of anti-corruption 
policies in the private sector is on the one hand related to making it a priority at the 
national level, and on the other hand to its being part of international economic agreements, 
conventions and institutions.  
• Georgia, which is the most successful country in the region, has prioritised tackling 
anti-corruption in the private sector through the action plan of its 2010 – 2013  anti-
corruption strategy.  
• In Uzbekistan, President Karimov signed a new law entitled “On the defence of 
private property and the guarantee of the rights of owners”, in September 2012. 
According to Karimov, the law was designed so that “every entrepreneur should 
know that he can without fear invest in his own business, expand production 
activities, increase production and generate income [...] keeping in mind that the 
government is guarding the legal rights of the property owner”35.  
• In order to secure property rights Kazakhstan ratified the Singapore Treaty on the 
Law of Trademarks and the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, 
Producers of Phonograms, and Broadcasting Organizations.  
• Uzbekistan began the accession process to the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement, 
while Armenia joined the World Trade Organization;  
• Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan are part of the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (Tajikistan became a candidate in February 2013). In 
Kazakhstan, 123 extractive companies have chosen to implement the principles of 
the organization, which include reporting on all contracts and expenditure. Kazakh 
companies are 'close to compliant' with all EITI standards, but the Kazakh 
government should encourage all extractive companies to submit to audits which 
are of an international standard.  
• In the FSU, the major barriers to business have been the licencing, customs and tax 
authorities. Recently, governments have started to address those problems in order 
to support economic development while reducing corruption. Russia eliminated the 
requirements for several preconstruction approvals and cadastral passports, 
Ukraine simplified the process of setting up a business and used an effective time 
limit for processing transfer applications, Belarus simplified property transfers by 
eliminating the necessity to obtain municipality approval in Minsk; Kazakhstan 
introduced an electronic system for granting licences; Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia and Ukraine introduced one-stop-shops to simplify the procedures for 
obtaining approvals. Reduced taxation and the use of electronic forms in the tax 
system have proved successful policies in Ukraine, Russia and Georgia. However, 
Kyrgyzstan and Belarus have increased the costs of doing business by introducing 
additional taxes, policies somewhat related to anti-corruption concerns although 
they envisage wider and deeper change in society.  
 
There are indeed a number of encouraging initiatives. In Russia, more than 20,000 firms 
formed coalitions to identify problematic legislation and to press for reform. One 
achievement was the simplification of obtaining permits, an accomplishment praised by the 
2013 Doing Business Report. In Ukraine, a coalition of business associations demanded that 
the National Prosecutor launch an investigation into the mayor of Sumy’s imposition of 
burdensome requirements on local businesses36. In Kyrgyzstan, the Bishkek Business Club 
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has been working to introduce anti-corruption programmes for businesses. Furthermore, 
Kyrgyz business associations have offered to cooperate with the Council for 
Entrepreneurship Development, so that the new legislation is produced in cooperation. A 
group of young Russian entrepreneurs set up a creative anti-corruption initiative. They 
developed ‘Bribr’ which was an iPhone application (app.) to report bribes across Russia 
anonymously. Using the app. anyone can enter information with details including location, 
the sum of money transacted and the reasons for offering or demanding the bribe. So far, 
nearly 3 million roubles have been reported, according to Bribr’s website.  
Politics remains the major source of problems. USAID showed that in the aftermath of 
the Orange Revolution, Ukraine made important steps towards addressing corruption, but 
the situation rebounded following political disputes. After the widely disputed Russian 
presidential elections, the relationship between Putin’s administration and the West, in 
particular with the US, was put under strain. The Russian government suspected that 
domestic unrest was being stirred up by foreign advocacy groups and so expelled USAID 
from the country in September 2012. In December 2012, the US passed the Magnitsky Act, 
freezing US assets and denying visas to a selected group of Russian officials who were 
allegedly involved in the murder of Sergei Magnitsky. In response, Russia passed a law to 
ban Americans from adopting Russian babies. Undoubtedly, the US act was not welcomed 
by either the Russian government or business circles, and Russia has been working hard to 
avoid a European version of Magnitsky Act. Nevertheless, it is difficult to say if it had any 
impact on anti-corruption reform in Russia, as the country received positive assessments 
from GRECO. 
The countries from this region seem rather keen to implement reforms when the 
‘carrot’ is access to markets, for example to labour markets in the case of Ukraine through 
the visa liberalisation programme, or protecting their own financial interests. The Cyprus 
crisis hit Russian business deposits hard, while the Magnistky Act put American 
investments under strain. For their part, the EU is unwilling to upset its neighbours given its 
dependence on Russian gas and other regional natural resources. Economic forecasts for 
the next 30 years suggest Russia will be the second greatest world provider of oil, and 
Ukraine is a strategic partner since a large proportion of Russian gas flows to the EU 
through Ukrainian pipelines. It is no surprise then that at the EU-Russia summit held in 
Yekaterinburg in June 2013 both parties agreed that the EU and Russia had a harmonious 
and strategic partnership. Russian president Putin stated that in 2012 the trade turnover 
between Russia and the EU grew by 4.1% and expressed his hopes that the trend would 
continue and would soon reach the $500 billion mark. According to Deutsche Welle, the 
relationship between Russia and the EU is governed by a ‘new pragmatism’ which refers to 
enhanced economic cooperation as opposed to opposition and conflict. In that context, the 
German newspaper reports that there was “only praise for the newly agreed road map 
sketching out energy relations”37 between the two partners, which means that Russia would 
open up its pipelines to competitors. The great effort to curb corruption in these countries 
must therefore come from within. 
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Conclusion  
 
This paper has surveyed anti-corruption trends in twelve FSU countries between March 
2012 and March 2013. It has found that the region does not show a coherent trend towards 
modernisation. Anti-corruption tools seem to have succeeded in Georgia, but failed 
dramatically in Turkmenistan. Countries such as Ukraine and Russia have fallen back after 
they had been making progress. Policy-wise, the most successful interventions have been 
those focused on changing the rules. However, these conclusions should be reassessed in 
the future because the countries in this region are at different stages in implementing these 
types of reforms.  
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